Many health economists recommend that employers provide employees with a riskadjusted choice among competing health insurance plans. However, formal risk adjustment is rarely if ever used by employers. This paper examines a range of health benefit design options available to employers, focusing attention not only on risk adjustment but also on its alternatives. We argue that while formal risk adjustment is rare, employers commonly use strategies that accomplish some of the same objectives at less cost. William E. Encinosa, Ph.D., is an economist at the Center for Organization and Delivery Studies, and Thomas M. Selden, Ph.D., is an economist in the Division of Modeling and Simulation, Center for Cost and Financing Studies, both at the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
In designing health insurance systems to provide coverage to groups with heterogeneous risks, many health economists prescribe offering individuals an open enrollment choice among risk-adjusted plans. Risk adjustment has been embraced enthusiastically (if imperfectly) by public health insurance programs in both the United States and abroad (Van De Ven and Ellis 2000) . In contrast, employers rarely if ever use formal risk adjustment (Glazer and McGuire 2001; Keenan et al. 2001) .
In this paper, we synthesize and extend the rapidly developing literature on the design of employmentrelated coverage. Whereas the topic of designing public health plans to promote efficiency and equity has received considerable attention from health economists, 1 it is only relatively recently that attention has shifted toward a more detailed understanding of employer strategies and behavior. We begin by examining the case for employer risk adjusting, showing how risk adjustment can increase both equity and efficiency relative to cases in which employers offer employees a choice among plans with defined (equal) employer contributions. We then consider a range of alternative strategies, including: a) linking employer contributions to plan characteristics; b) using fixed percentage and capped premium subsidies; c) actuarial methods for adjusting employer contributions; d) using self-funding or sole-source insurance carriers; and e) offering a single health plan with partial employer contributions. We also consider the potential implications of risk rating employee contributions and/or cash wages. In contrast to formal risk adjustment, many of these alternative strategies are in widespread use, and we believe that many may be providing at least some of the desirable properties of formal risk adjustment with lower administrative cost. This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simplified example illustrating the potential efficiency and equity losses that can arise from offering a choice of plans with defined (equal) employer premium contributions. The third section then shows how formal risk adjustment and its alternatives can help to promote both efficiency and equity. The final section presents conclusions. Throughout our paper, we illustrate main points with the assistance of simple numerical examples. These examples are not Ϫ500 50
Note: Net benefit ϭ (willingness to pay) Ϫ (reduction in cash wages ϩ out-of-pocket premium). Employer's contribution seen as reduction in wages. Enrollment choice is in bold type. a Net benefit with separation.
intended to be realistic simulations, nor do they span the full range of possible outcomes. Rather, they are intended solely as aids to help simplify and clarify our presentation.
Offering a Choice of Plans with Equal Employer Contributions
In 1997, 52.1% of all private sector employees in firms that offered coverage had a choice from at least two plans. 2 Offering multiple plans allows the employer to tailor coverage to help meet each employee's demands. Moreover, when plans are offered by multiple insurance carriers, the resulting competition for enrollees may help to hold down costs (Enthoven 1988) . Whether competitive forces actually result in substantial savings is an open empirical question, however. Indeed, Vistnes, Cooper, and Vistnes (2000) observe that offering multiple plans from multiple providers can result in higher premiums by diluting the employer's bargaining power. Certainly administrative costs (for both the employer and the insurer) would be minimized by offering only a single plan, a consideration that may be especially important in small firms (where these largely fixed costs would be spread over relatively few workers). Given our focus on risk adjustment, a more salient concern is that offering workers an open enrollment choice among plans has the potential to confound incentives for economic efficiency with the self-selection incentives surrounding subsidies across workers with different risk levels. The result can be outcomes that are far from efficient-and that may be undesirable from the standpoint of at least some types of employees.
One important issue in this regard can be the employer's premium contribution strategy. Among em-ployees of large employers that offered choice in 1995, Hunt et al. (1997) classify 23.5% as having faced equal or ''defined'' employer premium contributions (so that all premium differences are reflected in employee out-of-pocket contributions). One concern is that equal employer contributions may cause low-risk employees to select less generous plans, leaving high-risk employees to face high premiums in the more generous plans, and eventually causing the more generous plans to collapse. Table 1 illustrates this case, showing how a premium spiral can arise following the introduction of a second, more restrictive plan. For simplicity, the firm is assumed to have an equal number of low-risk employees and high-risk employees. 3 In the top row, the firm initially offers only one generous plan in which all workers enroll. For each risk type, the table presents the employee's willingness to pay for coverage, expected claims (inclusive of any administrative costs), the employer's premium contribution of $1,000, the employee's out-of-pocket premium contribution (equal to average expected claims minus the employer's contribution), and the resulting employee net benefits. To calculate net benefits, we assume that the employer's premium contribution is borne equally by both risk types in the form of lower cash wages; we also assume that both risk types face the same out-of-pocket premium, so that net benefit equals willingness to pay minus the reduction in cash wages and the out-of-pocket premium. We have constructed this example in such a way that both risk types would receive a positive net benefit from insurance if they each paid their own actuarially fair premiums-although the gain from coverage for low-risk workers in this case is just offset by the fact that the low-risk Notes: X H ϭ additional employer premium paid to plans selected by high-risk workers. The reduction in wages is equal to the firm's average premium contribution across plans: ½(1,000ϩX H ) ϩ ½(1,000). Enrollment choice is in bold type. Net benefit ϭ (willingness to pay) Ϫ (reduction in wage ϩ employee contribution).
workers are required to cross-subsidize the coverage of high-risk workers. The second panel of Table 1 shows how introducing a more restrictive plan can result in low-risk workers leaving the generous coverage. In this example, although low-risk workers would prefer more generous coverage if they faced actuarially fair premiums, they move to the more restrictive plan to avoid paying large cross-subsidies to the high-risk workers. 4 This case is illustrated in the table by boldfacing the different plan enrollments of the two risk types. Note, however, that as low-risk workers shift to the restrictive plan, the out-of-pocket premium faced by high-risk workers rises. In this example, the premium increase (spiral) for the generous plan is so great that high-risk workers would also leave that plan in favor of the more restrictive one. In essence, the opportunity to pool with low-risk workers in the restrictive plan distorts the incentives the high-risk workers face, leading them away from the generous plan. Thus, the third panel of Table 1 illustrates the new equilibrium in which workers of both types would pool in the more restrictive plan (as illustrated, once again, with boldface). 5 This example illustrates the potential for the introduction of choice to reduce both efficiency and equity. Both risk types would prefer to be in the more generous plan (apart from any cross-subsidies), and aggregate employee benefit declines as a result of choice. Basically, the out-of-pocket contributions that arise in open-enrollment group coverage confound coverage cost differences among plans, thereby distorting employee plan choice (a question of efficiency). 6 Moreover, the cross-subsidies paid by low-risk workers to high-risk workers decline (a question of equity across risk types).
One implication of this example is that introducing a more restrictive option has the potential to increase the net benefit of low-risk workers even when the result is the collapse of the more generous coverage.
Whether this is attractive to employers may depend in part on the labor market for low-risk, healthy workers. Forward-looking workers may be willing to support generous coverage even if they are currently low risk, insofar as they, too, face the possibility of becoming higher risk in the future (Cutler and Zeckhauser 1998) . At the same time, workers may not all have such long planning horizons, and for at least some employers the extent to which low-risk, healthy workers benefit from the firm's health offerings may be a matter of substantial importance. 7 As we will see later (in the section, ''Risk Rating Employee Outof-Pocket Premium Contributions and/or Wages''), firms concerned about attracting and retaining lowrisk, healthy workers may resort to linking cash wages to health risk (or a correlate, such as age). However, before turning to outright wage discrimination as a solution to the employer's problem, we first consider a wide range of alternative health benefit designs that employers might use to promote efficiency, equity, and the firm's ability to attract and retain especially low-risk workers.
Formal Risk Adjustment and Its Alternatives

Formal Risk Adjustment
In formal risk adjustment, employers vary their premium contributions across employees according to a formula relating the total premium paid to insurers to observable individual characteristics such as age or health conditions (or even something so simple as number of people in a family). At the same time, employee out-of-pocket premium contributions remain undifferentiated by risk type. Overall, formal risk adjustment entails employers offering insurers larger premium contributions for high-risk workers than for low-risk workers. Table 2 illustrates the introduction of an additional employer premium contribution, X H , paid to plans selected by high-risk workers. We add a column show-ing the reduction in worker wages (again under the assumption that all employer premium contributions are shared equally by employees). This example illustrates how risk adjustment (if sufficiently large) can convert a premium spiral (as illustrated earlier) into a two-plan separating equilibrium. In the case depicted, if high-risk workers selected the generous plan, their out-of-pocket premium contribution for that plan would decline by the amount of the risk adjustment, X H . So long as X H exceeded $300, then the generous plan would, in fact, be preferred by high-risk workers, while low-risk workers would continue to prefer the restrictive plan (unless X H was set too high). 8 Indeed, at X H ϭ $300, both risk types would be made better off relative to the case of equal employer premium contributions in Table 1 . 9 This potential to improve efficiency and equity (as well as to improve the firm's attractiveness to low-risk workers) is the conventional argument in favor of risk adjustment.
Despite this potential, formal risk adjustment is almost never used by firms (Keenan et al. 2001) . One obvious obstacle is that it requires a firm to observe the potential risk of all employees and their covered dependents-and to adjust the firm's premium contributions on behalf of each employee accordingly. 10 In the theoretical literature on risk adjustment, it is becoming increasingly clear that there are alternative strategies that employers can use to adjust their premium contributions-alternatives that share important similarities with formal risk adjustment, but at lower administrative cost. Perhaps not surprisingly, these alternatives are in widespread use among employers.
Linking Employer Contributions to Plan Characteristics and Premiums
One alternative to formal risk adjustment is for an employer to make unequal premium contributions linked not to individual worker risk types, but rather to plan characteristics. For instance, in the example in Table  2 , if the employer can observe plan generosity, and if it is known that higher-risk employees differentially self-select into high-generosity plans, then the employer can contribute more to plans with greater generosity. 11 The resulting payment flows and net benefits would be the same essentially as in Table 2 , except instead of making an employee-specific risk-based payment, X H , the employer would contribute an extra amount X to the generous plan (i.e., the plan predicted to be differentially attractive to high-risk workers). This would lower the generous plan's employee out-of-pocket premium, thereby increasing its attractiveness to high-risk workers until a separation occuredin exactly the same way as with formal risk adjustment.
By linking employer contributions to plan characteristics rather than to employee characteristics, employers may avoid considerable administrative burden. Nevertheless, to implement this strategy employers must be able to identify which plans will be selected differentially by high-risk employees. This may be more difficult in practice than our simple example suggests, insofar as plans can differ in many hard-to-measure ways that can affect enrollment patterns across risk types.
An even simpler alternative to formal risk adjustment is for the employer to make larger premium contributions to plans with higher premiums, essentially subsidizing employee choice at a fixed-percentage rate (perhaps up to a cap). 12 Because a fixedpercentage employer contribution would be larger for high-premium plans chosen by high-risk workers, the subsidy would act as a form of de facto risk adjustment. In the example in Table 2 , instead of the firm making contributions linked to individual risk characteristics, the employer might agree to pay x% of any premium amounts in excess of, say, the lowest premium. In this case, the firm's contribution would be $1,000 ϩ x*( Ϫ $1,000), where is the plan premium. Indeed, setting x ϭ .2 yields the same equilibrium depicted in Table 2 if X H ϭ 300, with the firm paying an extra $300 per enrollee toward the generous plan. Marquis and Long (1999) found that 34% of all establishments offering choice in 1997 used a fixedpercentage contribution scheme, and Hunt et al. (1997) found that, among large employers offering choice in 1995, 76.5% of all employees worked for employers making unequal contributions of one sort or another. Premium subsidies also are used in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and may have played a role in helping to mitigate adverse selection in that program (Gray and Selden 2000) . Similarly, Feldman, Dowd, and Maciejewski (2001) consider subsidies of this form among city and county public employers, showing evidence consistent with public employers adopting premium subsidies when facing relatively greater prospects for adverse selection. When employers adopt a fixed-percentage premium subsidy, however, one concern is that high-risk workers may choose excessive levels of coverage (unless the subsidy is capped). Another, potentially greater disadvantage is that premium subsidies can weaken incentives for workers to select plans that offer good value for each premium dollar, and this weakened incentive may encourage low-cost plans to ''shadow price'' high-cost plans (Hunt et al. 1997; Cutler and Reber 1998) . In this respect, premium subsidies present very different incentives than formal risk adjustment-so there may be a trade-off between the administrative costs of linking contributions to individual characteristics vs. the efficiency losses from distorting incentives with subsidies.
Actuarial Methods for Setting Employer Contributions
Yet another strategy for setting employer contributions uses actuarial methods. 13 In this approach, the extent of biased selection into a plan is inferred, essentially as a residual calculation, using actuarial assessments of plan generosity. In terms of Table 2 , the difference in the expected claims (inclusive of administrative costs) between the high risks in the generous plan ($2,500) and the low risks in the restrictive plan ($1,000) is $1,500 (i.e., $2,500-$1,000)part of which is due to differences in generosity and part of which is due to differences in the riskiness of the plans' enrollees. If it were possible to determine how much of this differential was due to plan generosity, then the remainder would be a measure of biased enrollment. The strategy requires actuarial tables to form an estimate of the coverage cost difference between the two plans for, say, a high-cost enrollee. From Table 2 , we know this amount is $1,000 (i.e., the coverage cost in the generous plan, $2,500, minus the coverage cost in the restrictive plan, $1,500). Thus, a measure of biased enrollment is the full premium differential ($1,500) minus this coverage factor ($1,000) or $500. Indeed, if we vary the employer's contribution by this amount (paying $500 more to the plan receiving the high-risk enrollees), we once again have the case in Table 2 (with the employee-specific adjustment X H being replaced by a plan-specific adjustment to the generous plan of X ϭ $500). The result is an unequal contribution strategy that essentially is identical to the formal risk adjustment strategy discussed earlier. However, in this case, the slightly larger difference in the employer contributions means that the outcome would be slightly more beneficial for high-risk workers (and less beneficial for low-risk workers). Of course, the problem with the actuarial method is that the difficulty of assessing the pure coverage effect may be as great as (or greater than) the difficulty in risk adjustment of identifying risk types and assessing the impact that risk will have on coverage cost. Indeed, at some level the two problems are really one and the same.
Self-Funding and Single-Carrier Systems
In 1997, the share of employees (who had employersponsored coverage) enrolled in self-funded plans was 33% (Frank and Rosenthal 2001) . In that same year, more than half (53%) of all establishments offering a choice among plans restricted that choice to plans offered by a single carrier (derived from estimates in Marquis and Long 1999, Exhibit 2) . In 1998, 86% of firms with 200 or more workers had self-funded feefor-service (FFS) plans, 83% had self-funded preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 68% had self-funded point-of-service (POS) plans, and 23% had self-funded health maintenance organizations (HMOs) (KPMG 1998) . Although employer decisions to restrict choice or to self-fund are likely to be driven by considerations unrelated to selection, nevertheless, both practices may act as de facto forms of risk adjustment. 14 Essentially, when choice is restricted to a single carrier or when the firm self-funds coverage, losses on the high-risk plan can be offset internally with profits on the lowrisk plan, thereby helping firms to reduce losses from adverse selection.
To see how this might work, consider the case of formal risk adjustment in Table 2 (e.g., with X H ϭ $300). With risk adjustment, a firm contributes more toward the premiums of high-risk workers. As a result, these employees face lower employee out-of-pocket contributions in the plan they select, thereby removing their incentive to leave the generous plan. Note, however, that a single carrier could offer the same two plans with the same out-of-pocket contributions as in Table 2 , thereby generating the same insurance plan choices, even if the employer does not employ risk adjustment. This is true so long as any losses on the generous plan are offset by profits on the more restrictive plan. For example, the employer might pay $1,150 per employee, with employees paying $1,200 for the generous plan and $0 for the restrictive plan. In this case, the carrier would earn a profit of $150 per lowrisk worker in the restrictive plan, but this would be offset by a loss of $150 per high-risk worker in the generous plan. Alternatively, if a firm were self-funding these two plans, the firm could require these same employee contributions, leaving the firm to cover more expected expenses for the generous plan than for the more restrictive plan. In either case, workers would face the same set of incentives as in Table 2 , thereby leading to the same outcome.
Using these implicit forms of risk adjustment helps Note: X is the employer's contribution. Enrollment choice is in bold type. Net benefit ϭ (willingness to pay) Ϫ (reduction in wage ϩ employee contribution). employers avoid the administrative burden associated with formal risk adjustment. Nevertheless, it requires that out-of-pocket contributions be set correctly, probably requiring actuarial calculations as described previously. Moreover, relying on insurers to provide generous coverage at a loss may create problematic incentives for skimping on care.
Offering a Single Plan with a Partial Employer Contribution
In the examples presented previously, employer contributions are structured so that all employees take up coverage. Nationally, however, take-up rates for offered employment-related coverage were only 80% in 1996 (Cooper and Schone 1997) . Incomplete takeup may reflect, at least partially, employer strategies designed to accommodate the preferences of employees with low willingness to pay for coverage. 15 By reducing their premium contributions, employers create self-selection incentives such that only those employees with greater willingness to pay for coverage actually receive coverage. To the extent that willingness to pay is linked to health risk, partial employer contributions can help firms provide at least some workers with coverage without imposing undue burdens on low-risk workers, thereby at least partially avoiding the need for risk adjustment.
In Table 3 , we modify the assumptions in the previous examples, giving low-risk workers relatively low willingness to pay for coverage and low expected claims. 16 In the top panel, we see that low-risk workers would receive a strongly negative net benefit from a fully funded, generous plan due to the cross-subsidies they would be paying to high-risk workers. Low-risk employees expecting to stay for the long term might be willing to pay such cross-subsidies in return for the protection such coverage provided against their risk of becoming higher risk in the future. Nevertheless, some employers might view such negative net benefits as obstacles to attracting and retaining low-risk, healthy workers. 17 The second and third panels of Table 3 show how reducing the employer's premium contribution could result in low-risk workers dropping coverage. In the second panel, we see the choice facing low-risk employees of whether or not to leave the pooling plan. We assume that employees who opt out of coverage must continue to bear their share of the burden of employer premium contributions (so that cash wage offers are not linked to the employee's decision of whether to take up coverage). 18 So long as the employer's contribution X was less than $650, low-risk workers would have an incentive to retain coverage, and their presence in the pooling plan would help to hold down out-of-pocket premium contributions. If, however, low-risk employees dropped coverage, as in the third panel, then the plan premium would rise to $2,500, creating an even larger obstacle to enrollment by low-risk employees (and an even larger out-ofpocket burden on high-risk employees).
As Table 3 illustrates, this strategy has the potential to increase the net benefit of low-risk workers if the employer contribution is set low enough to force a separation (whereby low-risk workers drop coverage). In essence, this strategy is much like the case of risk adjustment illustrated in Table 2 , except that the choice facing employees is now between the generous plan and no coverage. In both cases, the employer makes different contributions to the choices of the two risk types. Also in both cases, a separation occurs that enables the employer to increase the wellbeing of low-risk, healthy workers relative to the net Note: Z is the out-of-pocket premium that the employer charges only to the low risks. Net benefit ϭ (willingness to pay) Ϫ (firm contribution ϩ employee contribution).
benefit they would obtain relative to pooling risks in a single, generous plan. However, this solution is also like choice with risk adjustment in that high-risk workers receive a lower net benefit, and the total net benefit for employees declines, thereby raising issues of both efficiency and equity. Moreover, insofar as low-risk workers face the possibility of becoming higher risk in the future, expected benefit over the longer term may be reduced for both types of workers when employers pursue such strategies. A large and growing share of U.S. workers are required by employers to pay a portion of the premium if they are to receive coverage. Levy (1998) presents results from the Current Population Survey showing that the percentage of all plans that require partial or full employee contributions grew steadily from 54% in 1979 to 71% in 1994. Using the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson survey, Levy also shows that 28% of workers in firms that offer coverage are offered only one plan, and that plan requires an employee contribution. Perhaps as a consequence of increased employee premiums, evidence suggests that take-up rates for offered coverage declined substantially between 1987 and 1996 (Cooper and Schone 1997) .
Risk Rating Employee Out-of-Pocket Premium Contributions and/or Wages
Employers typically offer employees an open enrollment choice among plans, whereby employees with different risks pay the same out-of-pocket contributions for a given plan. If an employer were instead to charge employees risk-rated out-of-pocket premiums, then it could tailor those premiums closely to worker risk levels. Table 4 illustrates this case (using the original benefit and risk assumptions in Table 1 ). If the employer's contribution is $1,500, then the two riskrated employee contributions can be written as $1,000 Ϫ Z and Z (so that the total of employer and employee contributions covers the total expected costs). Essentially, Z captures the extent of cross-subsidization, enabling the employer to shift from full pooling (with Z ϭ $500) to strategies that provide low-risk workers with even greater net benefit than risk-adjusted choice (e.g., Z ϭ $0). Essentially, this strategy enables the employer to maximize aggregate net benefit while simultaneously setting the degree of cross-subsidization (thereby helping the employer avoid imposing low net benefits on low-risk workers). It is easy to see that the same outcome also could be obtained if employers varied cash wage offers (rather than premium contributions) by health risk.
Of course, risk rating employees' out-of-pocket contributions and/or wages would raise numerous issues. The information requirements are as large as with formal risk adjustment, requiring employers to delve into the health risks of all covered employees and their covered dependents. Moreover, even employees who are currently low risk may prefer not to have differences in actuarial costs reflected fully in out-of-pocket premiums, given the possibility that they may become higher risk in the future. Certainly risk rating contributions violates the widely held social norm of open enrollment, and linking cash wages to health risk violates norms (and laws) regarding wage discrimination. 19 This is especially true insofar as differences in health risk stem from health shocks that are more random in nature compared to differences in age or harmful practices such as smoking. Whether or not one views risk rating as a serious alternative for employers, we believe that it is useful to examine this and related strategies, if only to help clarify some of the trade-offs underlying the design of health benefits when risk rating is not allowed.
A Caveat Regarding Heterogeneity
A basic goal shared by many of the aforementioned risk adjustment strategies is confronting each employee with an out-of-pocket premium differential that more closely reflects only that employee's marginal cost of selecting a more generous plan-not the impact on premiums of enrollment decisions by other workers. However, as Emmett Keeler of RAND observed during the risk adjustment conference in Boston, this goal becomes unattainable, even in theory, if we in-troduce additional dimensions of heterogeneity to the highly simplified model considered earlier. Consider the case in which employees vary not only with respect to risk, but also with respect to their ''taste for insurance'' (e.g., they may have differing degrees of risk aversion). In terms of the risk adjustment in Table  2 , if some low-risk workers have strong enough preferences for coverage that they may select the more generous plan, then the ideal employer contribution scheme would need to confront both types of workers with their incremental costs of coverage. Unfortunately, this is not possible (absent risk-rated employee contributions), because high-risk and low-risk workers have different incremental costs.
The full implications of this insight have yet to be examined. Most theoretical analyses of risk adjustment limit the extent of heterogeneity in tastes, so this problem is obscured. However, it is important to note that if first-best risk adjustment is intrinsically unattainable, then we are confined essentially to the world of the second best. Against this backdrop, it likely will be all the more true that selecting an appropriate health benefit design is a trade-off among administrative feasibility, the firm-specific nature of the problem to be solved, and each firm's objectives in regard to attracting and retaining workers and maintaining within-firm equity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a wide range of strategies that employers might select when faced with the problem of providing insurance benefits to a heterogeneous workforce. From a theoretical standpoint, there is widespread agreement among many (but not all) health economists that if risk adjustment could be implemented at low cost, then the optimal employer strategy would be to offer employees an open enrollment choice from multiple, risk-adjusted health plans. A main theme in our paper is that although firms rarely use formal risk adjustment, there are many other strategies that share at least some of the properties of risk adjust-ment-and perhaps at lower cost. Indeed, many of these alternative strategies are in widespread use in the market for employment-related coverage.
In the process of exploring employer strategies to offset adverse selection, our analysis also touches on a number of deeper questions regarding the optimal sharing of health care burdens and how this can be achieved through an employment-related system of health coverage. As described in Monheit, Nichols, and Selden (1996) , the magnitude of the cross-subsidies within employment-related coverage were large in 1987 and likely have grown since then. Our analysis highlights the concern that firms may face limits in their ability to implement what is essentially a massive system of private voluntary transfers. As health care expenditures have grown and the tax subsidy rate has fallen, firms have coped only imperfectly with the resulting increase in this burden. Offering employees a risk-adjusted choice among plans can help firms reduce the burdens placed on low-risk workers. However, this is only an imperfect solution. Moreover, movement away from a system of employment-related pooling with high take-up rates can result in a reduction in aggregate benefit, a decline in equity, and a reduction in protection for low-risk workers against becoming higher risk in the future.
Against this backdrop, it is vital to understand better not only the strategies that firms are using, but also how the successes and failures that firms are experiencing are related to the design of the government tax subsidy. As noted in Monheit, Nichols, and Selden (1996) , the subsidy as of 1987 was reducing by as much as one-half the cross-subsidies that some low-risk, high-income workers were paying into employment-related pools. Given the last decade's decline in employment-related coverage, and given recent proposals to reform the tax treatment of employer contributions to health insurance premiums, we believe that obtaining a better understanding of employer strategies and responses should be the highest research priority.
Notes
This paper was prepared for the conference, ''Private Employers and Risk Adjustment,'' held February 8-9, 2000, and hosted Research and Quality (1997) . Marquis and Long (1999) use data from the Robert Wood Johnson (RWJ) establishment survey to find that 43% of health plan enrollees were offered a choice among plans in 1997. In contrast, the percentage of establishments offering choice is much lower, 28.1% (AHRQ) and 17% (Marquis and Long). 3 The adverse selection examples presented in this paper draw heavily on the analysis in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) . 4 For empirical evidence on adverse selection in response to equal employer contributions, see Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) , Cutler and Reber (1998) , Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) , and Gray and Selden (2000) . 5 It is easy to construct alternative examples in which only some or none of the employees leave the generous plan. For example, note that if the willingness of highrisk workers to pay for the restrictive plan was $1,700, then they would remain in the generous plan, thereby yielding a separating equilibrium. 6 Alternative examples could be constructed in which the generous plan is inefficiently generous, in which case there would be efficiency gains from a premium spiral. For more on this subject, see Cutler and Reber (1998) and Cutler and Zeckhauser (1998) . 7 This is similar to Crocker and Moran (1998) , in which the benefit manager effectively faces a participation constraint that the benefit package should be designed so as to attract and retain low-risk workers. 8 To rule out pooling, note that if all workers select the restrictive plan, the out-of-pocket premium contribution for employees will be $250 Ϫ X H /2. This yields a net benefit for high-risk workers of $550 (i.e., $1,800 minus the sum of $1,000 ϩ X H /2 and $250 Ϫ X H /2). At X H ϭ $300, this is lower than that which the high-risk employees could obtain by selecting the generous plan. Similarly, if all workers were to select the generous plan, its premium would be high enough to induce lowrisk workers to shift to the more restrictive plan (unless X H is set too high). 9 Risk adjustment of this sort essentially yields a ''doubleton equilibrium'' of the form described in Spence (1978) and Miyazaki (1977) . For more on risk adjustment and doubleton equilibria in health insurance markets, see Selden (1998) . 10 Equivalently, the employer could make equal dollar contributions on behalf of all employees and then implement a more explicit risk adjustment among the offered plans, making transfers to (from) insurers receiving disproportionate numbers of high-risk (low-risk) enrollees. This type of risk adjusting has been used by the Minneapolis Buyers Health Care Action Group and by the Health Insurance Plan of California (Knutson 1998; Bertko and Hunt 1998) . 11 This is, in essence, the ''lump-sum'' subsidy proposed by Crocker and Snow (1985a) . 12 See Selden (1999) . 13 We are indebted to George Model of Towers Perrin for presenting the actuarial approach discussed in this section at the Boston conference and for discussing these issues with us. 14 One advantage of restricting choice is that firms can benefit from the focused bargaining power described by Vistnes, Cooper, and Vistnes (2000) . Two advantages of self-funding are that the firm: 1) avoids paying premium taxes, which vary by state from 1% to 3.5%, and 2) avoids having to cover state-mandated services. However, for a firm to self-fund, it must collect all its past claims data from its previous insurers in order to underwrite and re-insure its self-funded plan. This may be costly. Also, self-funded plans have found it costly to set up their own external review systems. It is interesting to note that the incidence of self-funding is inversely related to the administrative costs of each plan type. FFS costs about $15 per employee per month to administer, PPO plans cost $15 per employee per month plus a nominal network access fee, POS plans cost $30 to $45 per employee per month, and HMOs are the most expensive with administrative costs ranging from 12% to 18% of each employee's monthly premium (Business Insurance, 1999) . In addition, firm size may be a factor. Small firms may prefer not to self-fund and to use a community-rated plan to smooth out large firm-specific jumps in premiums. In contrast, very large firms may prefer to self-fund so that they can directly contract with medical groups and hospitals at discounted rates. 15 See, for example, Levy (1998) and Dranove, Spier, and Baker (2000) . 16 Alternatively, we might have increased the proportion of high-risk workers or increased the cost of insuring high-risk workers. At issue is what Crocker and Snow (1985b) termed the minimally efficient doubleton equilibrium (and its relationship to the riskiness and risk aversion of an insured group). 17 This, of course, will depend in part on what other employers are doing (i.e, on the choices available to lowrisk workers). 18 Note, however, that some employers offer employees cafeteria-style benefit plans in which employees would have the option of using employer contributions for other, non-health benefits. In such cases, employees who decide not to take up coverage effectively may avoid the burden of employer premium contributions. 19 Risk rating employee contributions is rarely done in practice. Using data from the 1993 RWJ survey, among employees with employment-related single coverage only .6% faced employee contributions that varied by health status. An additional 3.8% faced employee contributions that varied by health-related factors (smoking, other health habits, age, or gender) and/or non-health factors including employee characteristics such as income or position (Monheit and Selden 2000) . There is, however, growing evidence that wages may reflect at least some coverage cost differentials, such as those associated with age (Sheiner 1999) and being a woman of child-bearing age (Gruber 1994) . In both cases, however, it is unclear whether the cash wage offsets represent person-by-person risk rating for expected health coverage costs or some combination of wage adjustments using age and/or sex as a proxy, workforce differences across firms, and/or wage adjustments linked to correlated non-health variables such as income. Note also that even if age and/or sex are used to adjust cash wages, these explain only a relatively small part of the predictable variation in health expenditures (Newhouse 1994) .
